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





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
BY

M. TULLIUS CICERO

TRANSLATED FROM THE LATIN
BY BENJAMIN E. SMITH



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


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


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(ON FRIENDSHIP)

INTRODUCTION


QUINTUS MUCIUS,¹ the Augur, used to repeat very entertainingly from memory many of the sayings of Caius Laelius,² his father-in-law, to whom he

... POSSIBLE AND
ted, I remained at
man's side. It th
pened that I was a
commit to memory
of his longer disc
as well as his brie
pithy remarks, an
devote myself to th
creasing of my own k
ledge through his wis
When he died I att
myself to Scaevola
Pontifex Maximus, v
I venture to call the
.. .



place. I return now to the Augur.

Among the many that I remember, I recall in particular one occasion when, seated, as was his custom, in his hemicyclium⁵ with myself and a few of his most intimate friends about him, he chanced to speak of a matter that was then



... καὶ ἑταίρια ἵνα ἴδωμεν
repeat to us a conversation
about friendship which
Laelius had held with him
and with his other son-in-
law, Caius Fannius,⁹ the
son of Marcus, a few days
after the death of Afri-
canus.¹⁰ The substance
of this conversation I
committed to memory,
and I have set it forth in
my own words in this es-
say, casting the matter in
the form of a dialogue to


feel that he has been listening to the speakers themselves.

For you have often urged me to write something on this topic, and it appears to me also to be one that is worthy of the consideration of all, and especially of such friends as ourselves. I was, therefore, very willing to grant your request, and in granting it to be of service to others also. And as in "Cato the Elder," or "Old Age," which was inscribed to you, I introduced the aged Cato as the chief disputant, because no character seemed to me so suited to one who should

in vigor; so it has seen to me fitting to assign Laelius the thoughts about friendship which Scaevola remembered that he uttered, especially since we have heard from our elders that the intimacy that existed between Laelius and Publius Scipio¹² was very remarkable. Besides this method of presenting the subject, resting as it does on the authority of illustrious men of former

I, when I read my own book on "Old Age," sometimes feel that it is not I who am speaking, but Cato himself.

As I, an old man, then wrote to an old man of old age, so now I write lovingly of friendship to the best of friends. Then Cato spoke, a man older than almost all his contemporaries and of greater practical wisdom than any; but now that friendship is the theme, Laelius, a man both wise — for so he was



of Africanus. The conversation is opened by them and Laelius replies. Their whole talk is of friendship; and in what they say you will find yourself portrayed.



THE CONVERSATION

FANNIUS. That is true, Laelius. For there never was a better man than Africanus, nor one more illustrious. But you should remember in your grief that the eyes of all men are now turned upon you, whom they both think and call the Wise. For although, as we know, this title was given by our fathers to Lucius Atilius,¹³ and recently to Marcus Cato,¹⁴ both of them received it for reasons some-

account of the variety of his attainments: for so much practical wisdom both in the Senate and the courts—so much foresight in planning, energy in execution, and skill in defense—was credited to him, that in his later years “the Wise” became as it were his distinguishing name. You, on the other hand, are so esteemed, not only on account of your

you are wise, not as the crowd reckons wisdom, but in that higher sense, understood only by the truly learned, in which it was said that in all Greece no one was wise save that one man¹⁵ at Athens who was declared to be the wisest by the Delphic oracle (for the Seven, though so called, are not held to belong to the number of the truly wise by those who think more profoundly).

This wisdom people think you possess—a wisdom which teaches you to seek the source of all happiness in yourself alone, and to esteem the haps and mishaps of life as insignif-




cant in comparison with virtue. Accordingly they are asking me, and Scaevola too, I suppose, how you are bearing the death of Africanus; and their curiosity is increased by the fact that recently when we assembled, as usual, for




self-restraint the grief which the death of this most excellent man and very dear friend has caused you, though you are too full of human kindness not to suffer keenly from the loss. I tell them, however, that the reason of your absence from the official meeting of the Augurs was not your affliction but ill-health.

LAELIUS. And you answered well, Scaevola, and truly. For had I been well I ought not on account of my unhappiness to have neglected a duty which I have always punctually discharged; nor do I think that any misfortune can cause a man



of firm character to be guilty of such shortcomings. But, Fannius, when you tell me that wisdom and virtue are attributed to me beyond what I can admit or desire, you speak as a friend; and I do not think that your judgment




men lost were boys : Cato's son was a mature and honored man. Wherefore do not heedlessly prefer to Cato even the man whom Apollo declared to be the wisest. For Socrates is, indeed, famous for his words; but Cato is illustrious through his deeds. This in reply to Fannius : as regards myself, I will now answer you both.


If I were to deny that I deeply feel the death of Scipio, those who profess to be wise in such matters¹⁹ must judge whether such an attitude of mind is right or wrong—but certainly I should not be telling the truth. For I do feel the




loss of the best friend that I know man ever had or, I feel sure, ever will have. But I need no external remedy for my wound; I am able to heal myself, especially with the consoling thought that, unlike most who are overwhelmed




... sic ? For unl
he had wished — what
never thought of — to
exempt from death, wh
was there within th
proper limits of huma
desire that he did not at
tain ? — he who by the ex
traordinary virtues of his
early manhood surpassed
even the highest hopes
that his fellow-citizens had
already formed of him in
his boyhood; who never
sought the *Consul* .




late for the safety of the Republic; and who by the overthrow of two cities, both fiercely hostile to our state, not only put an end to existing wars but also prevented them for the future. Why should I speak of his gracious manners, of





a few more years of life ?
For old age, even though
it may not be in itself
a burden,—as I remem-
ber Cato maintained in a
conversation with Scipio
and myself the year before
he died,—necessarily im-
pairs that vitality and vigor



most glorious one was the day before his death, when toward evening, on the adjournment of the Senate, he was escorted to his home by the Conscrip Fathers, the Roman people, the Latins, and the allies. From this lofty plane of honor he seems not to have descended to the shades but to have ascended to the gods.

For I do not agree with those²⁰ who have of late

...SAGES—of our ances-
who surely would not
established religious
for the dead if they
thought that the dead had
no concern in them;
those philosophers who
by their schools and
instruction made Magna
Graecia²¹ (now utterly de-
cayed but then flourishing
famous for learning; and
of that sage, judged by the
oracle of Apollo to be
the wisest of ~

—you, and that this return
is easiest for the most up-
right and the best. And
this was also the belief of
Scipio who, almost pro-
phetically, a little while
before his death, in the
presence of Philus,²² Man-
ilius,²³ and several others,—
and of you, too, Scaevola,
for you had come with
me,—talked on three suc-
cessive days about the

...in the de
easy in proportion to
moral worth, for w
can this flight to the
have been easier than
Scipio? I, therefore,
to lament his fate lest s
grief should show more
envy than of friendsh
Even if the truth is w
the other belief, that so
and body perish togeth
and that no consciousne
survives, it remains certa
that if death brings not
inc

to him, as I have said,
the best has happened;
though not to me, for as
I came into the world be-
fore him I ought to have
been the first to leave it.
But so delightful is the
recollection of our friend-
ship that the happiness of
my life seems to me to
have been that I lived
with Scipio; for we were
united in domestic and
in public affairs, at home

reputation for wisdom
which Fannius just men-
tioned — and which
certainly not merited —
by the hope that
memory of our friends
will never perish; and that
I have at heart the more
because in all the past
scarcely three or four pairs
of friends have become
famous — a group in
which I hope, the friend-
ship of Laelius and Scipio
will be known to
posterity.

voia too, I am sure —
you will talk to us abo
friendship, just as you c
about other matters whe
your opinion is sought
telling us what are yo
ideas about it, what,
your opinion, is its cha
acter, and what rules yc
would lay down with r
gard to it.


. SCAEVOLA. I shall b
very glad to listen; and
was about to ask you t
do this when Fannius ar

LAELIUS. I certainly would not hesitate if I felt confidence in my ability; for the subject is a very attractive and important one, and we are, as Fannius has said, at leisure. But who am I that I should discuss this theme or what capacity have I to do it justice? To speak without preparation on topics suggested by others is a custom among philosophers, especially the Greeks. But the art is a difficult one, and requires not a little practice. It seems to me, therefore, that you would do better to seek what can be said about friendship

life; for there is nothing else so fitted to nature — so well suited both to prosperity and to adversity. But I assert as a first principle that friendship can exist only between those who are good; nor would I split hairs in defining this word “good,” as some²⁵ do who discuss these matters with sub-


cept the wise. This may be true; but they understand by wisdom something that no mortal being has yet attained; while we ought to have in view those traits which have a place in the experience of common life, and not those which are mere products of fancy or objects of aspiration. For I will never call Caius Fabricius,²⁶ Manius Curius,²⁷ or Tiberius Coruncanius,²⁸ wise, though our ancestors judged them to be so, if I have to measure them by the standard of wisdom set up by these philosophers. Let them keep, then, for themselves that

But this they will not do; they will not for a moment concede that any one can be good who is not, in their sense of the word, wise. Let us appeal, then, to plain common sense. From this point of view it is clear that those who so act and live as to prove their good faith, uprightness, justice, and generosity, and show that they harbor no covetousness, licentiousness,



had those whom I have mentioned,—ought to be called the good men they are esteemed to be, because, as far as men can, they follow nature, which is the best guide to a good life.

For it seems to me evident that from the very fact of our birth there ex-



matter good will may be
taken away, but never
from friendship; since
when good will is lost the
very name of friendship
is destroyed, while that
relationship remains. How
great the power of friend-
ship is can best be seen
from this, that in human
fellowship, wide as it is
and established as it is by
nature herself, the sphere
of true and tender affec-
tion is so narrowed that

... with good-
and affection: and no
ter thing than this, it see
to me,— unless we exc
wisdom,— has been giv
to man by the immor
gods. Some prefer wealt
some health, some powe
some public honors, an
very many pleasure. Bu
the last is, as an end, worth
only of beasts, while th
others are precarious and
transitory, and depend no
so much upon our
1...


ue there can be no friendship at all.

Nor would I, like some philosophers,²⁹ define virtue, as I here employ the word, in grandiloquent terms, but rather in accordance with our ordinary habits of life and speech, citing as virtuous men those who have been esteemed to be so — the Pauli, the Catos, the Galli, the Scipios, the Philii. Ordinary human life finds


ideal perfect beings³⁰ whom nobody has ever seen.

Among these good men of real life, however, friendship has advantages almost more numerous than I can name. For, in the first place, what life can be worth living, as Ennius³¹ says, which lacks the calm joy which flows from the mutual affection of friendship? What is sweeter than the possession of a friend with whom one can commune as with one's own soul? What enjoyment would there be in prosperity without one to rejoice in your good fortune as much as you do yourself?

And adversity would be still



ed without the
etic friend who is
eved than you by
fortune. In short,
er things that men
or are fitted, almost
for particular ends
wealth for use,
for the securing of
honors for ap-
le



says, we have as many uses for friendship as for fire and water. Nor do I speak now of friendship of the common and ordinary sort,—though this is both pleasant and serviceable,—but of true and perfect love, like that of the few whose mutual affection has become famous. Friendship such as this makes prosperity more bright, and by dividing and sharing adversity lightens its weight.


Friendship, moreover, not only comprises the most numerous and important practical advantages, but is also preëminent in this, that it throws


e light of a good hope
ward into the future, and
oes not suffer us to be-
come down-hearted or de-
pressed. For he who
beholds the face of a true
friend sees, as it were, a
duplicate of himself. And
so, though absent, they are
not; though needy they
are not; though weak

If you should take away from nature the bond of good-will no home or city could survive, nor could even the cultivation of the fields go on. Indeed, if there is any doubt about the great power of friendship and harmony, it can be removed by a glance at the obvious results of strife and discord; for what house is so stable, what state so firmly based, that it cannot be overthrown to its foundations by disaffection and malice? From this you can judge of the value of friendship. A certain philosopher³² of Agrigentum, it is said, composed a poem in




Greek, in which he sang that all things throughout the universe that move apart are dissevered by discord, while those that stand united are drawn together by love. But this all mortals understand, and prove its truth by their





was Orestes — Pylades declared that he was Orestes in order that he might be slain in his friend's stead, while Orestes insisted that he was the true Orestes— as in fact he was! The spectators rose to their feet, and applauded to the echo



from those who make a business of such discourses.

FANNIUS. We would rather hear it from you though I have often put questions to those philosophers and heard their answers with pleasure. Your discourse, however, has somewhat different stamp.

SCAEVOLA. You would say that more emphatically, Fannius, if you had been present recently in

an advocate of justice he was when he answered the studied speech of Philus!

FANNIUS. It was easy for the most just of men to defend justice.

SCAEVOLA. And why not friendship? Is it not easy for him to defend it who has attained the highest renown for preserving it with the utmost fidelity, constancy, and equity?

LAELIUS. But this is to employ force! For what matters it how you compel me?—I am compelled beyond a doubt. For it is not easy, nor is it right, to refuse the earnest request of one's sons-in-law

that has most been —
forcibly occurred to me is
this: whether friendship is
to be sought because of a
feeling of weakness and
need, in order that by the
giving and receiving of
favours, each may obtain
from his friend what he is
least able to do for himself,
and, in turn, may render
his friend the same aid;
or whether friendship —
though this mutual aid-
giving is one of its essen-

founded more deeply in the very nature of man. For the inner sentiment of love, from which, in Latin,³⁵ the word "friendship" is derived, is the chief source of all outward friendly conduct. Profit, indeed, is often gained from those who are honored in pretended friendship only, and are esteemed only because they relieve the needs of their intimates; in true friendship, on the contrary, there is no feigning, no deceit, but whatever is done comes from a true heart and a free will. Wherefore it seems to me to spring from nature herself rather

loving rather than from calculation of the advantages that may flow from it.

Its true character may, in fact, be perceived even in some brutes, for they love their offspring for a time and are, in turn, so loved by them that this natural affection is easily discerned. In man, of course, this is much more clear; first

horrible crime; and then in that similar feeling of love which springs up when we find some one whose nature and habits are in harmony with our own and in whom we think we see a bright example of integrity and virtue. For there is nothing more lovable than virtue, nothing that more quickly wins affection; in fact, for their virtue and uprightness we love even those whom we have never seen. Who does not hold the memory of Caius Fabricius and Manius Curius in affectionate regard, though he never saw them? And who on

the other hand, does not
loathe Tarquinius Super-
bus³⁶, Spurius Cassius
and Spurius Maelius³⁷.
Two generals, Pyrrhus
and Hannibal⁴⁰ fought for
the conquest of Italy: the
former we respect for his
integrity, the latter we de-
test for his cruelty. But
the power of uprightne-
ss is so great that we are con-
strained to love it in those
whom we have never seen
and even (which is most
striking) in an enemy, is
wonderful that the souls

strengthened by the receipt of favors, by the perception of affection, and by habitual intercourse; and when these are added to the original loving impulse of the heart good will begins to glow with extraordinary ardor. But if any think that it is begotten by a sense of need — in order to have a friend who may give us what we lack — they assign to friendship, as it were, a mean and ignoble origin in tracing its birth to poverty and want. If this view of its origin were true, then each one would be fitted for friendship in

self and is so thoroughly equipped with virtue and wisdom that he has need of no one, and regards his fortunes as dependent upon himself alone, that he excels in seeking and in preserving affection. How absurd not to admit this! Did Africanus have need of me? No, by Hercules! — nor I of him. For I was drawn to him by admiration of his virtue, and he loved me for the good


course only strengthened our mutual good-will.

But although the practical advantages that attended it were many and great, the true source of our friendship did not lie in the hope of obtaining them. We are not kind and generous in order that we may exact a return — for we do not put our good-will out at usury, but are by nature inclined to generosity; and in the same way, it seems to me, friendship should be sought not from the hope of pay but for the profit that is found in love itself.

sent. Nor is this strange. For men who have fixed all their thoughts upon an end so low and so ignominious cannot lift them to wisdom which is exalted, noble, and divine. Accordingly, we will dismiss these philosophers from our discussion; and we will assume it to be granted that the sentiments of love and the emotions of affectionate goodwill are begotten in us by human nature itself.

drawn together and devote themselves to one another, that each may enjoy the character and companionship of the one he has begun to love. In love there is equality in all respects, and each is more eager to confer favors upon his friend than to demand them from him; in this matter there is, indeed, an honorable rivalry between them.

Thus will the greatest advantages be obtained from friendship, and its derivation from nature, rather than from need, will be more noble and more real. For if friendships were



impairment of their utility by change of circumstances would dissolve them; but true friendships are eternal, because nature cannot change.

This will suffice for the origin of friendship, unless you have something to


quent conversations on this theme. He thought, it is true, that nothing is more difficult than to retain friendship unimpaired until the end of life. For it may often happen that the private interests of friends conflict, or that they differ in opinion on public affairs. Our habits and dispositions, too, he used to say, change — a result sometimes of adversity, sometimes of advancing years. And as an illustration of this he would cite the experiences of childhood, for boys who love one another most ardently often lay aside at the same time the carb

of youth and their mutual affection. Even if these early loves last until the dawn of manhood, they are apt to be destroyed either by rivalry in marriage, or competition for some other advantage which both the




the struggle for place and fame. Strong and often just dislikes, too, are begotten, when friends are asked for something that they cannot rightly grant, as, for example, aid in the gratification of lust or assistance in a crime. Those






dying hate. In fact, so many chances of shipwreck, Scipio would say, lie before friendship, that to escape them all, and come safely into port, would seem to depend not only upon exceptional wisdom but also upon rare good



er, to have aided them in their designs? We have seen how Tiberius Gracchus⁴⁴ was abandoned by Quintus Tubero⁴⁵ and other friends when he disturbed the peace of the Republic. Yet Caius Blossius⁴⁶ of Cumæ,—the guest




... HE WOULD NEVER
have desired such a thing,"
he replied, "but if he had
desired it I would have
done it." That was the
answer of a scoundrel!
And, by Hercules, his con-
duct did not belie, but
rather surpassed, his words;
for instead of giving obe-
dient assent to the auda-
cious scheme of Gracchus
he took a commanding
part in it, showing himself
to be a leader rather than


him and his fellows, he fled to Asia, took refuge among our enemies, and finally paid a heavy and just penalty for his crime.

It is, then, no excuse for wrong-doing to say that you sinned for a friend's sake; indeed, since the be-

solute wisdom to keep our friendships free from blame. The friends we are talking about, however, are not these ideal wise men, but real men whom we know, whom we have seen with our own eyes, or of whom we



gether, and colleagues in the censorship; and there is a tradition, also, that Manius Curius and Tiberius Coruncanius were close friends of these men and of each other. But we cannot imagine that either of these men would



rity; and it is as wrong to grant an evil request as to make it. Yet Caius Carbo⁴⁹ and Caius Cato⁵⁰ supported Tiberius Gracchus, as did also his brother Caius,⁵¹ at the time with little ardor, it is true, but now most zealously.

Fannius and Scaevola, that we ought to look far ahead for the dangers that may threaten it. Already it has, to some extent, occupied a different ground and followed a different course from those prescribed by the customs of


with Carbo ⁵³ as well as we could, on account of the recent punishment of Tiberius Gracchus; but what I anticipate from the tribunate of Caius Gracchus I do not care to say.


Moreover, another evil is creeping upon us; and




senate, and the most important affairs of state settled by the caprice of the mob; for more will know how these revolutionary movements may be effected than how to prevent them.

But why do I mention






on all the guilty — as well upon those who are merely followers as upon those who are leaders in the crime. Who, in all Greece, was more renowned than Themistocles?⁵⁵ who more powerful? Yet when, as commander in the Persian



fellow-citizens who would aid him in his attack upon his native land; and so both committed suicide. Such association with evil-doers, therefore, is not to be protected by the plea of friendship, but is rather to be punished with the ut-




am about their present condition.

Let this, then, be held to be the first law of friendship, that we should ask from our friends only what is right, and should do for them only what can honorably be granted.


when given should be obeyed.

Certain philosophers, who are regarded as wise men, I am told, by the Greeks, entertain strange opinions on this topic—for there is nothing which they do not argue about

pleasant when it is driven
with loose reins, which can
be tightened or relaxed at
pleasure; and that the chief
element in a happy life is
freedom from care, which
the soul cannot enjoy if
it is, as it were, in travail
for many friends. Others




for friends; from which it follows that women from their feebleness are more likely than men are to seek the protection afforded by friendships, as are also the poor more than the rich, and the unfortunate more than those who are es-




a good cause or do an honorable act, or to abandon one that has been undertaken, simply to avoid trouble. If we are to shun care, virtue also must be shunned, since it is, of necessity, at considerable pains to scorn and hate

And so if grief of heart and mind comes to the wise man,—as come it must, unless all human kindness be torn from his soul,— why should we totally remove friendship from our lives lest it bring us some annoyance? For

that it can, as it were, expand to fit the good fortune of a friend or contract to suit his griefs. Accordingly even that profound distress which must often be incurred for a friend's sake is not of sufficient weight to drive friendship



springs into being. For what can be so absurd as to be delighted by many intrinsically worthless things, such as public honors, fame, fine houses, and the clothing and adornment of the body, and not to be entranced by a soul




acter does to friendship, it must surely be granted that the good love and attract the good as if they were joined to them by kinship and by nature; for nature is very desirous of its like and quick to grasp it.



unserviceable, or proud. It even guards whole nations and gives them the wisest counsel; and this it surely would not do if it were averse to the love of mankind in general.

Now the most lovely bond of friendship is sev-




who on account of their wealth, resources, and especially their virtue — which is the greatest safeguard — have least need of others are most generous and liberal. I am not sure, indeed, that it would be well that our friends should



not, therefore, to be listened to when they talk about friendship, of which they know nothing either in theory or in practice. For who, by the faith of gods and men, would be willing to accept a life of luxury and a superabund-




is feared? Yet tyrants
are flattered with a false
show of friendship as long
as they can be made of
use; but if, as often hap-
pens, they are overthrown,
their lack of true friends
is at once manifest. Thus
Tarquin, when he was ex-
posed to have de-



it is also true that the wealth and power of those in high station often prevent the formation of faithful friendships. For not only is Fortune herself blind, but she also often blinds those whom she embraces. And so her favor-






they have abundant resources, ability, and wealth, what can be more silly than to procure horses, servants, costly clothing, rare vases, and everything else that money can buy, yet not to procure friends, who are, so to say, the best and



of fortune, a life unadorned and deserted by friends cannot be happy. But enough on this topic.


We must now determine what are the limits of friendship and, as it were, the bounds of love. On this point I find that three





he should be rated by his friends.

With no one of these three opinions can I entirely agree. It is not true, as the first would have it, that we should feel toward a friend only just what we feel toward ourselves; for




friends. There are also many ways in which good men diminish their own comforts, and suffer them to be diminished, in order that their friends may enjoy them instead.

The second opinion, which limits friendship to


something should le
or fall to the groun
lest more than the
amount should be p

But the third rule—
each should be valu
his friends as he v
himself—is the me
of all; for there are
who are apt to becom
pressed about thems
and to have little hop
bettering their fortune
is the duty of a fri
therefore




him fresh hope and pleasanter thoughts.


It remains, then, for us to establish another limit for true friendship; but first let me tell you what Scipio was wont to censure most of all. He used to assert that nothing more inim-



seeker after honors who would make everything serve his own ends. For how could any one be a friend to one to whom, at the same time, he thought he might be an enemy? Nay, it would even be necessary strongly to de-



The true rule, on the contrary, he said, is that we should use such care in selecting our friends that we would never begin to love one whom we could ever hate. Even if we are not very fortunate in our choice of friends, it is bet-




comes to aid friends by promoting wishes of theirs that are not strictly right, and their lives or reputations are at stake, it is permissible to deviate from the path of rectitude, provided no great dishonor result: since there is a point



tion of our fellows, ought least of all to be sacrificed.

But he used to complain — for I return often to Scipio, who spoke on every opportunity about friendship — that men are less painstaking in friendship than in other mat-



should be chosen as friends who are firm, steadfast, and unchangeable — a kind of man of which there is a great scarcity, and which can hardly be distinguished without considerable experience; this experience, however, can be obtained




have been in some measure tested.


The worthlessness of some friends appears in matters involving a little money; while others, who are not affected by a small pecuniary consideration show their true character






tion on the other, will not promptly choose the latter? For human nature is too weak to despise power; and those who rise to place and power on the ruins of friendship believe that their fault will be overlooked, because





To pass over this adverse influence of ambition, how difficult and how burdensome seems to most men participation in the misfortunes of others! — a fellowship to which few condescend. Though Ennius says rightly, “The faith-




be regarded as belonging to a very rare and almost divine class of men.


The chief support of that stability and constancy which we seek in friendship is good faith for nothing is stable that is unfaithful. Moreover



is to be added that one should never take pleasure in finding fault with one's friends, nor be ready to believe the charges that may be brought against them: this, too, is essential to the constancy of which I have just spoken. From




hate openly than to hide
his feelings by his looks
and second, not only to
repel accusations that are
brought against his friend
by others but also not to
be suspicious himself nor
be always thinking that
his friend has done some
thing to offend him.] The
should also be a certain
gentleness and courtesy of
manners and of convers-
ation for this gives friend



that promotes good-fellowship and affability.

At this point arises a question of slight difficulty, namely, whether new friends who are worthy of our friendship are ever to be preferred to the old, as we prefer young and




done. New friendships, if like thrifty plants, they give promise of fruit, are not, of course, to be rejected, but old friends must keep their own places in our hearts: for great is the value of long continued companionship. Nay, one would rather use the horse — to recur to that illustration — to which he is accustomed, provided he is still sound, than one that is strange and ill



they may be with mountains and forests.

It is very important in friendship to conduct oneself as an equal with intimates who are one's inferiors; for in a group of friends it often happens that some surpass the rest



but by no means Scipio's equal; and he wished all his friends to become richer and more distinguished through his aid. In this all ought to copy him, and if they have attained some preëminence in virtue, talent, or fortune, ought to impart it to, and share it with, those to whom they are most closely related. Thus, if one is born of humble parents, or



their true birth and descent, and have been discovered to be the sons of kings or of the gods, retain their affection for the shepherds whom for many years they have supposed to be their fathers. To act thus toward fathers who are



ought to put themselves on an equality with their inferiors, it is equally true that the latter ought not to be vexed on finding themselves excelled by their friends in talents, fortune, or rank ; yet most of them are always finding




favours ought to be remembered by the one who has received them, but they should not be mentioned by the one who conferred them. Accordingly, in friendship, those who are superior ought to condescend to those who are be-




thus should be raised in their own esteem by friendly words and deeds.

The amount, however, that ought to be bestowed on any one should be measured first by what you are yourself able to accomplish, and secondly



brother Lucius.⁶¹ But even if you are able to do anything you wish for another, you ought to consider his capacity.

[In general, friendships can best be judged when maturity of years and character has been reached; nor



affection; nor ought they to be neglected, though they should occupy in our regard a different position from that which our friends hold. Friendships which do not thus receive the sanction of mature judgment, but are based merely on early association, cannot last.] For unlike characters result from unlike pursuits, and such disparity destroys friendship.




It is well, also, to lay down the rule that immoderate affection should not, as often happens, be permitted to stand in the way of important services that friends can render. Thus—to borrow another illustration from




for that very reason
perfect friend. In sh
should in all thing
sider what one m
from a friend, and
one can allow his
to obtain from him


The breaking-o
friendships is som
however, a misfortu
cannot be avoided
in saying this I c
from

is reflected upon those who are their friends. In such cases it is well to get rid of friendship by lessening intercourse, and, as I have heard that Cato said, by drawing out the threads rather than by cutting them asunder; unless the offense that has been committed is so unendurable that it is neither honorable nor right that the separation should not be effected at once. But if some change of character or of pursuits has occurred, as is often the case, or if a difference of opinion with regard to public affairs has arisen, — I am speaking, as I




friendships of the wise
but of ordinary ones,—
one should take care lest
there may seem to be not
merely an abandonment
of friendship, but also a
kindling of enmity; for
nothing is more repul-
sive than to become an






of his personal authority
or bitter hostility.


Accordingly, we should
first of all endeavor to pre-
vent disaffection from
coming between friends ;
but when anything of the
kind has happened, let
our friendships seem to die






injury may be seen to be in the wrong, not he who suffers it. Against all these errors and misfortunes there is one preventive and guaranty — the avoidance of haste in forming attachments and the choice of worthy objects of affection.







nothing in human affairs as good unless it yields some return, and they love those friends most — as they do their cattle — from whom they hope to obtain the most profit. Thus they lack that loveliest and most natural form of friend-






never be found; for such a friend is, as it were, a second self. Now if we find that all animals—birds, fishes, and beasts, tame and wild—first love themselves (for that is an instinct natural to every living thing), and then de-






Most, however, perversely—not to say shamelessly—desire to have friends whose character is what their own cannot be; and they demand from them what they cannot themselves give in return. The right course, however,





and each will bear anything for the other's sake, nor will either ask from the other anything that is not honorable and right: they will not only cherish and love, they will even reverence one another. For to take away mutual






reach heights to which unaided it could not attain. If any now have, or have possessed, or shall attain such fellowship, it should be regarded as the very best and happiest companionship that is possible, since it leads to the high-



good things, we must be at pains to cultivate virtue, for without it we can secure neither friendship nor anything else that is worth seeking. If it is neglected, those who think that they possess true friends find, when some serious emergency forces them to put their friends to the test, that



cially in the choosing and retaining of friends: for we adopt plans that begin at the wrong end, and do over again what has already been done, which is forbidden by the old proverb. After we have formed a close mutual at-




airs about whose usefulness men agree unanimously. Even virtue, depreciated by many, is said to be a sort of ostentatious display and pretense. Many scorn riches since they are content with a little, and are satisfied with frugal fare and a simple style of living: but


About friendship, however, all, to the last man, agree — whether they devote themselves to politics or take pleasure in philosophical studies, or carry on their business apart from public affairs, or, finally, are wholly absorbed in the pursuit of pleasure — that without friendship there can be no life worth living, provided they desire to live to any extent as becomes men who are not slaves.

For friendship entwines itself somehow about the lives of all; nor is any mode of life unacquainted with it. Nay, even when

anthropical that he hate
and shuns society,—lik
Timon of Athens in th
legend, if there ever wa
such a person,—he stil
must have some one into
whose ears he can pou
his gall. As the best il
lustration of this universa



dure such a life? Would not this solitude destroy, for any one, the enjoyment of every kind of pleasure? That saying, therefore, is true which, if I am not mistaken, was handed down through our elders, from those older than they,



ture loves not to be solitary, but always leans, as it were, on some support; and the sweetest of all such supports is a very loving friend. But while nature in so many ways makes known what she wishes, requires, and longs for,

must always be endured, that friendship may retain its utility and good faith be kept between friends; for friends should often be admonished and even sharply reprov'd, and such reproof when kindly given should be received in a friendly spirit. Yet somehow it is true, as my friend Terence⁶⁷ says in his "Andria," that "complaisance begets friends, truth hatred." Truth is, indeed, troublesome if in fact hatred, which is the bane of friendship, is begotten by it; but complaisance is much more injurious because by weak indulgence


of course doing it permits

spurns the truth
himself be carried
the complacer
friends into self
Accordingly, a
this whole n
should be extre
ful to keep our a
from harshness,
reproof from l
in complacency
it is right) on
hand — for I use



but of any man who is not a slave. For it is one thing to live with a tyrant, and another to live with a friend.

There is no salvation for the man whose ears are so tightly closed to the truth that he will not hear it




... have to
does not trouble
is the reproof
find hard to b
ought, on the co
grieve over thei
rejoice in correct

Since, then, it
tial to true friend
to give and to re
monition, and to
one freely and kin
the other patier




pled and treacherous men, who in all they say seek to gratify the wishes of their friends, and have no regard for the truth, ought to be branded under as many names as possible. While insincerity is in all cases reprehensible, — be-




able, and mani
what can be s
variable, as th
one who is tu
like a weathe
only by the
wishes of anothe
by his look and


“If any one
say no; if yes, I
in short, my rule
sent to everyth
Terence



tune, and reputation, and whose flattery is more injurious, since their influence gives weight to their empty words.

Moreover, a smooth-tongued friend may be known and distinguished from a true one, by the






thus lately filled
of the assembly
proposed the
reelection of the
of the people!
it; but I would
speak of Scipio
myself. So immortal gods,
immortal gods,
dignity of his
great was the
his address, that
easily have



demagogical law was rejected by the votes of the people. But, to return to myself, you remember how popular, in the consulship of **Quintus Maximus**, the brother of **Scipio**, and **Lucius Mancinus**, seemed to be the law of



... was pl
years before I be
sul; hence the
won more by
merits than thr
great influence c

But if on the
that is, in the p
sembly, which is
same thing,— wh
is the most favor
portunity for the
fancy and illus




upon truthfulness? For in friendship you can have nothing that can be trusted, nothing sure, unless, as they say, you can look into the open heart of your friend and reveal your own; you cannot even be certain of loving or being




to flatterers. Virtue, to be sure, loves itself, for it best knows itself and understands how lovable it is: but I am not speaking now of virtue, but of an exaggerated belief in one's own virtue: and the number of those endowed with




want to hear the truth and the other is ready to lie is not friendship at all. Nor would the flatteries placed in the mouths of parasites on the comic stage amuse us if there were not also in the plays braggadocios⁷² to be fooled by them.







vite it, even those who
have more sober and steady
fast minds ought to be ad-
vised to beware lest they
be caught by flattery
of a more cunning kind.
No one, unless he is very
stupid, fails to detect an
open flatterer; but it is






clearer-headed man. But what is more shameful than to be played with in this fashion? Look out that it does not happen to you as in the play:” “To-day you’ve hoaxed and cheated me beyond the lot of stupid old men in the comedies.”







briefly to the former topic,
and then bring this also
to a conclusion.


It is virtue, I say, Caius
Fannius and Quintus Mu-
cius—it is virtue that
both induces and pre-
serves friendships; for in
it are agreement in all
things, stability, and stead-
fastness. When it has
exhibited itself







these words are, in Latin,
derived from "loving."⁷⁵
Moreover, to love is nothing
but to have affection
for the one you love, without
any thought of a need
on your part which he can
relieve, or of any service
that he can render; though





tween those of the same
age, as it did between my-
self and Scipio, Lucius
Furius, Publius Rupilius
and Spurius Mummius
As an old man, on the
other hand, I have, in my
turn, found repose and
pleasure in the attachmen







that, if possible, we should reach the goal, as it were, with those of our own age with whom we started in the race; but since human life is so frail and so uncertain it is well to be always on the watch for younger men whom we may love






Nor is it visible to me alone, since I have always had it close before me; it will always stand out radiant and illustrious in the sight of future ages. Hereafter no one will ever undertake or venture to hope for what is great and






all delight. Never in the least did I offend him, as far as I know; not a word did he speak that I was unwilling to hear; we had one home, one table, and that a frugal one; and we were together not only in our military campaigns,



with him, I could
now endure my in-
longing for that dear
very loving friend.
they have not per-
they rather grow strong
and are increased in
memory and reflection
and even if I were
deprived of them, I should
still obtain great comfort



give to virtue so high a place in your esteem that it shall be the only thing that you prefer to friendship, which without virtue cannot exist.









NOTES


THE "De Amicitia," or "Laelius," was written in 44 B. C., a little later than the "De Senectute," or "Cato Major," and at the request of Titus Pomponius Atticus (see note 6), to




... or friends:
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sity of subordinati
and patriotism; 1
reason the scene of
was fittingly placed
the Gracchi which w
a like political unre:
this the discussion o
follows the lead of an
(of which this subject
essential part), consic
refuting, in particular,
ions of the Stoics and E
The more important n
references ...



L. Caecilius Metellus, in 117. It was the function of the college of Augurs, of which he was a member, to interpret the auspices (signs from the heavens, the direction of the flight of birds, etc.), with reference to proposed action on the part of the State, and to determine their validity. The office, which was for life, was one of great dignity



in politics, though he at first favored various measures designed to improve the condition of the lower classes, he became an ardent opponent of the popular movement represented by the Gracchi (see notes 44, 51). He was an eager student of Greek philosophy under the guidance of the Stoic Panaetius, and in his time was the exponent of Greek culture at Rome. His friendship for the younger ...



Marius and was slain in 82 B. C. As **Pontifex Maximus** he was the head of the college of pontiffs and the supreme religious authority in the state.

5. A hall or colonnade provided with semicircular recesses, and used for purposes of conversation; or a large semicircular alcove.


6. *Titus Pomponius Atticus.*




scribed by order of Sulla and put to death.

8. *Quintus Pompeius Rufus*, consul with L. Sulla in 88 a. c. He adhered to the aristocratic party and Sulla — a difference in politics which caused the loss of Sulpicius's friendship.

9. *Caius Fannius Strabo*, an orator and scholar, author of a history of his own time. He served under Scipio in the last war against Carthage, and with




and captured Carthage in 146 and Numantia in 133. He became consul in 147, and again in 134; in 142 he was chosen censor, an office which he administered with the rigid and conservative spirit of Cato. In politics he stood at the head of the aristocratic party, though in the earlier part of his career he showed himself not averse to certain popular reforms. The excesses of the popular party



doubtless been murdered. He was also a scholar and a noted orator.


11. *Marcus Porcius Cato* (born 234 B. C.: died 149 B. C.), called *Major* (the Elder) to distinguish him from Cato Uticensis (see note 14). He became censor in 184, and is famous for his efforts, in that office, to restore the morals and customs of



and Stoic philosopher, born in 95 B. C. He supported Pompey against Caesar, and committed suicide in 46 B. C. after the victory of Caesar at Thapsus over the troops led by Scipio Metellus, Juba, and himself.

15. Socrates.

16. *M. Porcius Cato Licinianus*. He attained distinction as a jurist and a soldier, and died



that the wise man should not
mit his mind to be disturbed
joy or grief.

20. The Epicureans, wh
materialistic doctrines, toget
with those of the other Gr
schools of philosophy, began
be taught at Rome about the ti
of Laelius.


21. The Greek colonies
southern Italy, the seats of
mous schools of philosop
among them that of Pythago
which taught



25. The Stoics.

26. *Caius Fabricius Luscinus*, who distinguished himself as a general in the war against Pyrrhus, 280–275 B. C.


27. *Manius Curius Dentatus*, noted as the conqueror of Pyrrhus in 275 B. C., and as the builder of the tunnel from Lake Velinus to the Nar. He was three times chosen consul, and



was the epic poem "Annals" (traditional Roman history), designed as a supplement to the Homeric Poems.

32. Empedocles, who called the fundamental forces of attraction and repulsion friendship and strife. He flourished early in the fifth century B. C.


33. The "Dulorestes," an adaptation of the "Iphigenia in Tauris" of Euripides. The reference is to that part of the



35. *Amor*, love, *Amicitia*, friendship.


36. *Tarquin the Proud*, the last king of Rome, a tyrant famous in Roman annals. The rape of Lucretia by his son Sextus, led, according to the legends, to his overthrow and the establishment of the Republic.

37. *Spurius Cassius Viscellinus*, a patrician, proposer of the



was finally beaten at Beneventum in 275. He treated his prisoners kindly and returned them without ransom.


40. *Hannibal*, the great Carthaginian general. He conquered Spain, crossed the Alps (218 B. C.), and defeated the Roman army in a series of famous battles. He was recalled to Carthage in 203, and was finally defeated by Scipio Africanus Major at Zama, in 202. He died by



dissuaded from attacking it by the entreaties of his wife and mother.

43. See notes 37 and 38.

44. *Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus*, a celebrated political reformer and popular leader, born about 163 B. C. He was the grandson of Scipio Africanus Major. On his election to the tribunate in 133 B. C., he proposed and carried, amid scenes of




46. Blossius fled to Ariston-
cus, king of Pergamos, and, when
his protector was conquered by
the Romans, committed suicide.

47. *Quintus Aemilius Papus*,
a soldier and statesman, consul in
282 B. C., and 278, and censor
in 275.


48. See note 26.

49. *Caius Papirius Carbo*,
popular leader, tribune in 133
B. C. He proposed a law for
the use of the ballot in enactin-
g laws and censoring magistrates.



ther's agrarian laws, and endeavored to lay the foundations of a pure democracy. He again became tribune in 122, but was defeated in 121, and slain in the disturbance which followed.

52. *Publius Scipio Nasica*, the leader of the aristocratic party that assassinated Tib. Gracchus. His course in this matter so enraged the people that his life was in danger, and the Senate, to save him, sent him on a pretended




of Xerxes at Salamis. He was ostracized about 470 B. C., and finally went to Persia. There is little probability that, as Cicero asserts, he committed suicide.

56. One of the Seven Wise Men of Greece. He lived at Priene in Ionia, probably in the sixth century B. C.

57. See note 22.

58. *Publius Rupilius*, consul in 132 B. C. He was a bitter opponent of the party of the Gracchi.

59. *Quintus Fabius Maximus Aemilianus*, eldest son of L. Aemilius Paulus and adopted son of Quintus



his father, his presence with the army before Troy was declared by an oracle to be essential to the capture of that city. He was one of those who entered the city in the wooden horse.

63. See note 62.

64. Chosen consul in 141 B. C., in opposition to Laelius. He gained his election by trickery.

65. *Quintus Caecilius Metellus*



68. A parasite in Terence's "Eunuchus," a comedy based on material borrowed from Menander.

69. See note 49.

70. Tribune of the people in 145 B. C.

71. The Rostra, on which the orators stood, lay between the Forum, where the plebeian assembly met, and the Comitium or meeting-place of the patricians, and it had been customary, even for the tribunes, to address the latter.


72. *Milites gloriosi*, bragging soldiers — favorite characters in the old comedies. The "Miles Gloriosus" was a well-known play by Plautus.

“Epiclerus” of Caecilius Statius.

75. See note 35.

76. *Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus*, father of the famous tribunes mentioned above, and son-in-law to the elder Africanus. He was tribune in 187 B. C., pretor in 181, and consul in 177 and 163. He attained great distinction as a general in Spain.









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
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